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Abstract 
We review the related academic literature and the international evidence on the 
institutions of regulation and competition policy, to analyze the creation in 2013 of the 
new macro regulator in Spain, the CNMC. The institutional reform merged the 
competition policy authority with virtually all sector regulators with the exception of the 
financial regulator. The aim of the paper is to assess the extent to which the Spanish 
reform follows international best practices as well as how it fits within the analysis 
found in the academic literature. Although there is not a universally superior approach, 
neither in practice nor in theory, important shortcomings remain with the model that 
was finally adopted in Spain. Some institutional diversity would facilitate an optimal 
level of regulatory independence and governmental coordination for each sector, and 
ultimately achieving better results in terms of consumer welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
Several international jurisdictions have been active in recent times in reforming 
the institutional structure of competition policy and regulatory authorities. A 
possible explanation for the surge in this particular type of reforms is that 
governments may have thought that action on this front is one of the few 
remaining tools at the national level to free the growth potential of the economy. 
Fiscal stimulus in general must be very carefully administered and industrial 
policies involving direct subsidies are on the decline. Furthermore, and prior to 
the financial crisis in the case of the European Union, progress in competition 
policy (Cini and McGowan, 2009) and the emerging notion of ‘services of 
general (economic) interest’ (Clifton et al., 2005, and Clifton, 2014) have been 
consubstantial with the political and economic integration in the region, and may 
also have inspired some of the reforms. 
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, we examine the most relevant 
academic literature and policy recommendations regarding institutional reforms 
in regulation and competition policy. Second, and against this background, we 
analyze the creation of the National Commission for Competition and Markets 
(CNMC) in 2013 in Spain (Law 3/2013) building on the work of Trillas (2013) 
and Xifré (2014). As mentioned above, and as acknowledged by the Spanish 
Government, a major rationale for undertaking this reform is that it would be 
highly effective to overcome the economic and financial crisis, and reignite 
growth. For this very same reason, and more broadly to assess the contribution 
of the reform to the public interest, it is important to assess whether the broad 
direction and specifics of the Spanish reform are appropriate and aligned with 
academic research and internationally accepted practices. 
We first review the most relevant academic literature and the main policy 
insights from past experience in reforming the institutions of regulation and 
competition policy (Section 2). In this section, we explicitly analyze how in 
general the reform of regulatory institutions fits into the broader debate about 
public intervention in network industries (see for example, Armstrong and 
Sappington, 2006, and Florio, 2013). The main message that emerges from this 
section is that while there are not universally optimal institutional arrangements, 
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several particular practices characterize the most successful reforms. On the 
theoretical front, there is a wider dispersion of perspectives but still some basic 
ideas are generally accepted, including the fact that agencies’ independence, 
accountability, and enforcing power are of the essence but very difficult to attain 
in practice for a variety of reasons. 
We next focus on the particular reform that the Spanish Government 
implemented by creating the CNMC in 2013 (Section 3). We first briefly review 
the state of affairs in competition policy and regulatory institutions prior to 2013, 
and then examine the CNMC reform process and content. We assess the 
reform by means of a detailed discussion and comparison with both the analysis 
of the theoretical literature and the internationally accepted practices.  
In Section 4, we conclude by summarizing our main concerns about the 
Spanish CNMC reform. In contrast with the model of maximal integration 
adopted in Spain, the case for a certain degree of institutional diversity appears 
to be jusitified because, although some consolidation and coordination may be 
beneficial, diversity creates the conditions for accountability and sound 
decisions for consumers in markets that are complex, subject to the pressure of 
interest groups, and uncertain.  
2. The Framework for Reform 
2.1 The economic analysis of the institutional architecture of regulation 
and competition policy 
The relevant literature on the economic analysis of the institutional architecture 
of regulation and competition policy, and especially on the role and structure of 
agencies, includes considerations of 1) regulatory independence, 2) incentive 
theory, and 3) the relationship between ex ante and ex post intervention (see 
Trillas, 2013, and Delgado and Mariscal, 2014). The issues of potential 
regulatory capture and policy delegation play a relevant role in each of these 
branches of the literature. Our concern here is how they give insight into the 
degree of integration between regulation and competition policy agencies. 
Existing research addresses other related topics about the structure of 
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agencies, such as whether there should be a clear individual or a collegiate 
body as head of an agency or the properties of term limits, but we do not 
address these issues here. 
The recommendation of regulatory independence is part of the paradigm of 
reform of network industries that has prevailed in Europe and in other regions of 
the world over the last twenty years, as analyzed by Florio (2013), who locates 
the origin of the reforms in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s. This 
paradigm also included privatization, liberalization, and vertical separation, 
although these reform vectors were applied to varying degrees in different 
jurisdictions. The relationships among these dimensions are not always 
straightforward, as explained in the case of the airport sector by Bel and 
Fageda (2013). Regulatory independence is justified by several reasons (as 
explained in Trillas, 2010), including the need to establish expertise in complex 
industries. The main rationale, however, relates to the need for capital 
investments. When there are specific long-lived investments, regulation faces a 
commitment problem, because the body in charge of regulation may be tempted 
to de facto expropriate investments once these are sunk. This problem may be 
alleviated by a variety of means (including public ownership and detailed 
legislation, as described by Newbery, 2000), but also through oversight by a 
regulatory agency that is relatively pro-investment and independent from 
electorally concerned governments (in a way similar to central bank 
independence).  
Interestingly, the reformers in the UK did not expect to create a permanent 
system of regulation (see Stern, 2003), as they were influenced by the Austrian 
School view that markets, and not regulation, as the best mechanism to 
promote efficiency. Independent regulatory agencies to control market power 
have also existed for more than a century in the US since the creation of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. Today, there are two federal US 
anti-trust agencies, one that is part of the executive and therefore not 
independent, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, and the other that 
is formally independent, the Federal Trade Commission. In addition, there are 
sector-specific federal regulatory agencies (namely the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) for energy and the Federal Communications 
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Commission (FCC) for telecommunications) and state regulatory commissions 
with multi-sector authority, as well as opportunities for private litigation. But 
international institutions, such as the World Bank or the European Commission 
(EC), promoted regulatory agencies mirroring the UK model instead of the US 
model perhaps fearing the political complexity (including appointment 
processes) that characterized the latter.  
Although independence may alleviate the commitment problem and help build 
expertise, there is an optimal degree of independence. As explained in Trillas 
(2010 and 2013) regulatory independence also has drawbacks. These include 
potential lack of coordination with the rest of government, expert biases (such 
as overconfidence and others), or potential for capture (as seen in the revolving 
door phenomenon of specialized regulators). The optimal degree of 
independence depends on administrative costs, the supply of expertise, and 
subtle issues of demand growth and technology (such as depreciation and 
asset specificity), and is thus contingent on sector, country, and time. The 
energy sector, for example, faces more coordination requirements than the 
telecommunications sector because of environmental and distributional 
concerns. It can be argued as well that independence does not solve, but rather 
relocates, the commitment problem. Regulatory independence transfers the 
commitment problem to the government or the legislative majority, which then 
needs to commit to preserving regulatory independence. Some countries have 
found this particularly difficult, raising the issue of the importance of taking into 
account not only the legal aspects of regulatory independence, but also the de 
facto or practice issues. These difficulties, and others described by Florio (2013) 
and in the reviews by Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) and Armstrong and 
Sappington (2006), illustrate the nuances of applying the reform paradigm. The 
main lesson we extract from this branch of the literature is that independence 
may be useful but it is difficult to implement and its optimal degree varies across 
sectors. As seen below, there are concerns that the Spanish reforms imposed a 
homogeneous level of independence for different sectors, reduced the overall 
level of regulatory independence, and by unilaterally changing legislation, de 
facto reneged on regulatory independence by taking advantage of the 
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legislative change to remove from office the regulators appointed by the 
previous political majority. 
According to incentive theory (see Trillas, 2013, and references therein), when 
the same agents perform more than one task, their incentives to deliver effort 
are stronger or weaker (as optimally set by their principals) depending on the 
degree of substitutability or complementarity of the tasks. Agents should face 
weaker incentives when tasks are substitutes and stronger when they are 
complements. When tasks are substitutes, but one of them is easier to measure 
than the other, there is the risk that the agent concentrates the effort on the 
most visible task, which is not necessarily the most relevant in terms of welfare. 
This problem is aggravated if we introduce behavioral considerations such as 
the availability bias, by which agents focus their attention on immediate issues 
that come to a given person's mind. When tasks are complementary, however, 
strong incentives in one dimension also favor other dimensions. This suggests 
that those regulatory tasks that have synergies, due for example to 
technological convergence, should be bundled together, but not those for which 
these synergies are absent, or those that show larger effort costs when they are 
performed together. A clear case for synergies can be made in the 
telecommunications, computing, and Internet sectors, where the concepts 
developed to deal with the open-access controversies justify a common 
approach both in regulation and in competition policy, as argued by Farrell and 
Weiser (2003). However, some competition among agencies (see Gavil and 
First, 2014) to find new solutions may be needed when there is uncertainty. The 
optimal mix of regulatory coordination or competition thus depends on the 
degree of complementarity, substitutability, and uncertainty. 
Combining independence and incentive issues, the accountability of 
independent agencies can be seen as more difficult when the number of tasks 
of the regulator expands, as it has arguably happened with financial regulation 
and with energy regulation in the recent past. 
The academic literature has more specifically addressed the relationship 
between ex-ante regulation and ex-post anti-trust (or competition policy). This is 
8

an especially relevant issue in network industries that face liberalization 
processes. These industries combine natural monopoly segments that require 
regulation, and potentially competitive segments that are the focus of 
competition policy (see Newbery, 2000). There is little doubt that these two 
policy instruments should be coordinated. In some countries, such as the UK, 
specialized regulatory agencies and antitrust agencies coexist, but have 
concurrent competition policy powers. The concern for market power interacts 
with other public concerns, such as other market failures (like externalities or 
asymmetric information) or equity concerns. Ex-ante regulation typically 
addresses this combination of issues (for example, through universal service 
policies), and usually includes a dynamic concern for sunk investments. Sunk 
assets are still important with deregulation, although in a proportion that 
depends on the specific technology. Bottlenecks remain in some segments and 
there is consensus that they require ex-ante regulatory attention. Due to the 
concern for investment in regulated segments, in the interaction between 
regulation and competition there is a trade-off between static and dynamic 
efficiency.  For example, in the short run allocative efficiency may call for low 
prices and intense competition, but long run concerns about incentives for 
innovation and investment may call for higher prices and milder competition, at 
least temporarily. Whether a single agency (combining antitrust and regulation) 
or a diversity of agencies will better deal with this trade-off depends on the 
pressures that they will face to pay attention to the different issues. Most 
jurisdictions have preferred to preserve at least some institutional diversity. 
Public intervention to address market failures, especially if it is in the form of ex-
ante stable and specific regulation, opens the door to special interests.2 Capture 
issues have been discussed in the literature in terms of their impact on 
horizontal institutional structure (the number of agencies), but no clear message 
emerges from the theory. Some authors, such as González (2006), recognize 
that the more general is the regulator in terms of the industries it oversees, the 
lower the possibility that it will be captured by a single firm or industry. In an 
integrated agency, the top executives need not be sector specialists and 
 
2 The door may not necessarily be crossed, see Carpenter and Moss, eds. (2014). 
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therefore their career will not be tied to a specific industry. A multi-sector 
agency with much power and impact will be more publicly visible and therefore 
more exposed to scrutiny of interested audiences such as consumer groups, 
business associations, parliament, media, etc. Greater public scrutiny improves 
accountability, but this must be accompanied by good commitment devices to 
avoid the derivation of public visibility into populism. Any decision not well 
founded, or influenced by capture, is more liable to be discovered. The larger 
institutional weight might also allow the agency to better resist interference or 
pressure from political power. In addition, one can imagine a context in which a 
company needs complementary permits or authorizations, if they are issued by 
separate agencies, where corruption could be more damaging than if they are 
delivered by a single agency. This is because agencies acting individually do 
not internalize the damage, or increased costs, that their actions impose on 
other agencies (as in the double marginalization problem in Industrial 
Organization). Finally, with a diversity of agencies there is the risk of “forum 
shopping,” that is, firms trying with different regulators until they find one that is 
convinced of acting in their interests. 
It is also possible, however, to question this result, by introducing the problem of 
asymmetry of information between agencies and between them and the 
regulated firm (see Laffont, 2001). The power conferred by information to the 
regulatory agency opens the possibility of being captured via bribery by the firm. 
If a multi-sector agency regulates a company that participates in several 
markets under its supervision, then the risk of capture may be higher than with 
several agencies because of subtle issues related to the firm’s willingness to 
pay to hide information. If there is only one regulatory agency, it will always 
know the maximum willingness to pay by the firm to hide information, and 
capture is always a possibility. If there are multiple agencies involved in the 
regulatory process, where each of them is in charge of reducing the asymmetry 
of information in a particular parameter, the maximum willingness to pay of the 
regulated firm will depend on the information available to each individual 
agency. The separation creates a coordination problem and an informational 
externality affecting the incentive of each agency to disclose information (to 
political principals), weakening the bargaining power of those institutions 
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relative to the regulated firm and making capture less likely. One agency also 
favors collusion with lobbies because with fewer colluding agents, the 
transaction costs of lobbying are lower, and the gains of keeping the collusive 
agreement are higher (less players to share the payoff) relative to the gains of 
breaking it. Additionally, with a two-tier vertical regulatory structure (government 
plus regulatory agency), if a powerful firm has a strategy of lobbying 
government (for example, through the appointment of former politicians to the 
board of directors, a phenomenon that is well documented in Spain as well as in 
many other countries), the firm may prefer that there are few and weak 
regulatory agencies that spoil this privileged access. Therefore, overall the 
relationship between agency structure and capture is in general theoretically 
ambiguous.3
Beyond capture concerns and more broadly, it is impossible to understand the 
evolution of the institutions of regulation and competition policy without 
understanding the political underlying forces behind these structures (see Moe, 
2013, and Marinello et al., 2015). Authors influenced by the New Institutional 
Economics, such as Spiller and Tommasi (2007), argue that what matters is the 
basic structure of political incentives, and that individual regulators or regulatory 
agencies are responsive to these underlying forces, such that small changes in 
agency boundaries may not be consequential. 
In practice, governments and legislative majorities find it difficult to commit to 
optimal structures. Regulatory agencies are fragile institutions because of the 
influence of political forces and interest groups, and their structure and powers 
are the outcome of a political game. The degree of regulatory independence 
and the horizontal (number of agencies) and vertical (allocation of 
responsibilities at federal or state level) agency structures are far from stable in 
most jurisdictions. These structures change with technology and market 
demand, and with the outcome of games played among governments, 
 
3 See also Estache and Wren-Lewis (2011), Dal Bó (2006) and Mishra (2006) for other 
institutional determinants of capture or corruption. 
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legislatures and the relevant interest groups, as will be illustrated with the 
Spanish case below. 
2.2 General policy principles for the reform of competition policy 
authorities 
The theoretical background of the previous section uses mostly positive 
economics to provide a framework to analyze institutional choices.  International 
organizations and practitioners take a more normative approach and generally 
agree that any effective competition policy should be characterized by a number 
of features, with the two main principles to be balanced being on the one hand 
accountability, and on the other independence from the government and the 
regulated industry (UNCTAD, 2008).  
Independence from political interference and from business influences as 
promoted by international organizations is required in order to ensure that an 
agency’s decisions are not politicized, discriminatory, or implemented on the 
basis of the narrow goals of interest groups. At the same time, independent 
institutions of competition policy are expected to be subject to government 
oversight and a well-defined system of checks and balances. 
The principle of accountability requires that all relevant stakeholders affected by 
competition decisions (the business community, consumers and public 
administrations) must know who is responsible for a decision, and the reasoning 
behind it. This principle extends also to the requisite that affected parties must 
be able to provide input through well-established, publicly-known, and open 
consultation processes. 
The particular way in which these two general principles are applied in each 
region and circumstance obviously differ but, following UNCTAD (2011), there 
are some internationally accepted practices that can be considered as robust 
guidelines for reform.  
Several formal safeguards have been employed internationally to ensure the 
independence of the competition policy institutions, such as legally protecting 
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the competition authority remit; appointing the director-general and the board 
members for a fixed period and prohibiting their arbitrary removal; providing the 
agency with a reliable and adequate source of funding; or exempting the 
competition agency from civil service salary limits in order to attract and retain 
the best qualified staff. 
In order to foster accountability, some of the actions taken internationally 
include publishing the law and statutes of the competition policy agency; 
requiring a formal review of its performance by independent auditors or 
oversight committees of the legislature; or mandating that the competition 
authority publishes its reasoned decisions. 
Apart from the requisites on independence and accountability, competition or 
antitrust agencies also need to have an adequate level of enforcement powers, 
as pointed out by Armstrong and Sappington (2006). In particular, the 
competition agencies are expected to be able to investigate effectively so that 
they can gather information in a timely manner and impose sanctions for non-
compliance. Along these lines, the international network of competition 
authorities (ICN) stresses that the quality of a competition agency’s 
enforcement depends on its ability to conduct effective investigations 
(International Competition Network, 2013). They recommend that competition 
authorities are granted legal authority to obtain all relevant information, through 
appropriate investigative tools, and in turn that the necessary institutional 
mechanisms and resources are in place to ensure that available evidence is 
given adequate consideration.  
From the standpoint of purely formal institutions, the number of competition 
authorities that are independent from ministerial control is increasing. According 
to the more recent figures of the UNCTAD (2011), competition authorities have 
been established in 112 countries and more than half of these authorities are 
separate from their respective ministries. 
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2.3 Recent developments in the reform of EU and national competition 
authorities 
2.3.1 The experience in the EU
The experience of the Directorate-General for Competition in the European 
Commission (EC) is of particular interest when considering reforms of the 
competition systems in EU countries. According to Lowe (in Vives, ed. 2009), 
some of the main institutional and operative reforms adopted in the past by the 
DG Competition include the creation of a Chief Competition Economist function 
in 2003; the implementation of a matrix structure by integrating Merger Units 
with Antitrust Units; and setting priorities and allocating resources on project-
based terms to somehow overcome organizational rigidities.   
In addition, the EC has a long trajectory of extending its own remit on 
competition matters by appealing to the notions of ‘service of general economic 
interest’ (SGEI) and ‘service of general interest’ (SGI). The Commission has 
made clear that these concepts form a central pillar in the process of EU 
institution building (see Clifton et al., 2005, and Clifton, 2014, for a detailed 
discussion of the role these concepts have played in the EU). The EC’s dual 
economic and political approach has paved the way for two developments that 
are very relevant to designing the architecture of competition authorities in the 
EU. 
First, the SGEI/SGI discourse has allowed the EC to become active in directly 
fostering competition within countries across an increasing number of 
industries. A notable example of this process, which Clifton (2014) coins as the 
EC moving from “Eurospeak” to “Euroaction”, happened in the 
telecommunication industry after the 1985 British Telecom case. In essence, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that certain services 
that had been provided by BT as a monopolist up until that moment should from 
then on be opened up to competition; the EC used this to expand liberalization 
to all telecommunications services.  
Second, in a more indirect but equally powerful manner, the appeal to SGEI and 
SGI provided the conceptual support for merging consumer protection and 
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regulation within public agencies. This follows the spirit of New Public 
Management (NPM), which prescribes among other things that public services 
and institutions should be more accountable to their direct users and taxpayers. 
An immediate corollary is that guaranteeing consumer rights based on 
standards for service delivery becomes a central function of the public sector. In 
practice this mission has been frequently assigned to the competition policy 
and/or regulation authorities. 
2.3.2 National Competition Authorities
Apart from the DG Competition, competition policy is also enforced by EU 
Member States, who have their own national competition agencies (NCA). This 
is justified mainly on the principle of subsidiarity, which is one of the central 
working principles in the EU. The principle states that the operations and 
services that can be ably performed by a lower-level public body (i.e., closer to 
final user) should not be transferred to a higher-level actor. Of course there are 
limits to this principle in cases in which the issue exceeds the borders of one 
Member State or other special circumstances concur.
From an institutional and organizational perspective, the legal structure and 
functioning of the individual NCA in the EU countries can be classified by two 
criteria, following Cseres (2010):  
• the number of competences allocated to the NCA, and  
• whether the NCA controls the two main competition policy functions 
(investigation and decision making) or whether these functions are 
separated into a dual system with two bodies or institutions. 
In terms of competences assigned to the NCA, there are three main legal-
institutional models across the EU. The first and more restrictive model implies 
that the sole responsibility of the NCA is the enforcement of the competition law 
(as in Belgium, Spain before 2013, and Romania). Under the second model, 
some form of sector regulation (e.g. energy, telecommunications) is also part of 
the competencies assigned to the NCA (as in Denmark, Austria and Spain after 
15

2013). Finally, the third type of agency combines the enforcement of 
competition law with some specific parts of consumer law, such as rules against 
deceptive or misleading advertising (as in Italy, Poland and the Netherlands 
after 2013).  
Different rationales might explain why the functions of consumer protection and 
regulation are merged in the agencies of certain countries. A very promising 
explanation, relying on behavioral economics, is that consumers do not always 
behave as fully rational agents who maximize their utility. Instead, it may be the 
case that, when purchasing a good or service, they are affected by a series of 
biases: inertia, risk aversion, status quo bias, choice overload, etc. (see Clifton 
et al. 2014 for a detailed explanation). On this basis, public institutions might be 
entitled to take certain actions (to protect the most vulnerable consumers) that 
limit the freedom of private operators, provided that no significant costs are 
inflicted to the non-vulnerable class of consumers.   
In practice this principle, which some authors refer to as “paternalism” (Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2003, and Camerer et al., 2003), would require, for instance, that 
service providers present their bills in simple and transparent terms, easily 
understandable to every consumer (example taken from Clifton et al., 2014) or 
to streamline the procedures for post-sale and quality-service claims. Given the 
nature of these interventions, which require extensive knowledge of the product 
or service market, regulators are optimally placed to undertake them.  
However, as pointed out by Viscusi and Gayer (2015), regulators themselves 
and their institutional environment may be affected by behavioral biases, such 
as failure to optimize, overconfidence on their own expertise, or intrinsic 
preferences. The public may have a concern not only for the outcome of 
policies and reforms, but also for the fairness of processes that make them 
possible. The design of institutional architecture should minimize the negative 
impact of those biases that make it more difficult to pursue consumer welfare 
and make the most of those that might actually promote it, such as a public 
sector ethos as an intrinsic preference. Intuitively, we would expect that a 
monopolistic agency would make it easier for negative biases to prevail and 
remain unchecked. 
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Of special interest are the recent institutional transitions in the Netherlands and 
in the UK. In the Netherlands, in April 2013 the new Authority for Consumers 
and Markets (ACM) was created as the result of the merger between the former 
Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa), the independent Post and 
Telecommunication Authority (OPTA) and the Consumer Authority. It includes 
the functions of regulation of the energy markets (see figure 1). This degree of 
quasi absolute integration is new in EU countries and it is only comparable with 
that of the Estonian Competition Authority (see figure 2). 
Figure 1. The organization of the Dutch Authority for Consumers and 
Markets, 2013 
Source. Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets. 
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Figure 2. The organization of the Estonian Competition Authority, 2013 
Source. Estonian Competition Authority 
The recent experience of the UK is also relevant. The Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA) was legally established on 1 October 2013 and it acquired full 
powers on 1 April 2014. The new body merged the Competition Commission 
(CC) with the competition and certain consumer functions of the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT). The consumer protection principle is of the essence for the new 
authority, this understood as “empower[ing] consumers to exercise informed 
choice, using both competition and consumer powers to help markets work well” 
(CMA, 2014). 
However, in contrast to the Netherlands, the UK competition authority and 
sector regulatory bodies are separate entities, with the latter having competition 
policy powers in their respective sectors. This separation between the 
regulation and competition agencies has been a long-standing institutional 
design feature of the UK competition policy framework.  
In terms of the internal structure of the NCA, most Member States have a 
system where one single administrative authority both investigates and decides 
over the cases, although the units are internally independent. In the past years, 
some member states, like Spain (2007), France (2008-2009), and Estonia 
(2009), have migrated from dual to single systems in competition policy. On the 
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other hand, Belgium and Luxembourg currently still opt for a dual administrative 
system, while in Ireland and Austria, investigations are carried out by the 
respective competition authorities and decision-making powers have been 
transferred to courts.  
Table 1 summarizes these two criteria for the classification of NCA of the UE27 
with their current structure, marking the recent changes in Spain, the 
Netherlands and the UK.   
Table 1 Classification of the National Competition Authorities in the EU 
Scope  
Functions attributed to the NCA
System  
Institutional integration of 
investigation and decision-making 
Competition 
only 
Competition 
+ regulated 
sectors 
Competition 
 + consumer 
protection 
Two agencies One agency 
Austria  X  X  
Belgium X X
Bulgaria  X   X 
Cyprus X X
Czech Republic  X   X 
Denmark X X
Estonia  X X  X 
Finland X X
France   X  X 
Germany X X
Greece X    X 
Hungary X X X
Ireland   X X  
Italy X X
Latvia  X X  X 
Lithuania X X
Luxembourg X   X  
Malta X X
Netherlands * X
(ACM, after 
2013) 
X
(ACM, after 
2013) 
 X 
Poland X X
Portugal X    X 
Romania X X
Slovakia X    X 
Slovenia X X
Spain
* 
(CNC, before 
2013)
X
(CNMC, after 
2013) 
  X
Sweden X X
United Kingdom *  X
(CMA, after 
2014)
 X 
Source. Authors’ preparation based on Cseres (2010). 
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3.  Institutional Reform in Spain  
3.1 Overview of regulatory and competition policy institutions in Spain 
before 2013
3.1.1 The Regulatory Institutions
Until 2011, there were four sectoral regulatory authorities in Spain (excluding 
financial regulation): the National Commission for Energy (CNE), the 
Commission for the Telecommunications Market (CMT), the Committee for 
Railway Regulation (CRF), and the National Commission for the Postal Service 
(CNSP).  
The first two were relatively strong institutions, as can be assessed from their 
budget and staff (see table 2), with a proven record in regulatory policy and a 
well-defined set of competences. However, the Spanish Government had kept 
for itself important legal competences in these two areas, including the ability to 
fix prices in the electricity market or the general management of digital spectrum 
in telecommunications. 
Table 2 Budget and Staff of the Regulatory Bodies in Spain, 2013 
Source. Report on Legal Impact, CNMC Creation Act  
Since 2010, in addition to these institutions, legal mandates have created three 
new regulatory authorities in the sectors of transportation, gambling, and the 
audio-visual industry. However, rather than forming standing-alone entities, 
Regulatory body Staff
Budget 
(million euro)
CNE (Energy) 214 26.4
CMT (Telecommunication) 145 18.4
CNSP (Postal Mail) 23 1.8
CRF (Railway) 2 0.2
Total 384 46.8
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these oversight functions were instead taken up by administrative units within 
the new CNMC (discussed below). 
3.1.2 The Competition Policy Institutions
Spain created genuine competition policy institutions only as a result of the 
integration process into the European Economic Community (EEC), although 
the first competition law was formally passed in 1963 (see CNC 2012a for 
further historical references). The process of reform crystallized in a new 
Competition Law passed in 1989, which relied on two standing administrative 
bodies: the Service for the Defense of Competition (SDC) and the Court for the 
Defense of Competition (TDC). The SDC was a Directorate-General within the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, initially performing information-gathering 
functions and later on taking on competition promotion functions. The TDC took 
on a more judicial nature but equally dependent on the Ministry. The limitations 
of this institutional arrangement became increasingly evident over time, in the 
form of lack of synergies, duplication of procedures, and weak transparency.  
The Spanish Constitutional Court acknowledged that the Spanish regions had 
legal competition policy competences that were not properly acknowledged in 
the 1989 Law. This, in parallel to major developments in the EU competition 
policy arena arising from Regulation 1/2003, paved the way for a substantial 
reform of the institutional and legal frameworks in Spain. 
With regard to legal and institutional reform, an open process of consultation 
with stakeholders started in 2005. The process integrated inputs from many 
parties: the incumbent competition institutions, the political parties, the trade 
unions and the business community as well as academics. The process 
achieved an important milestone with the preparation of a White Paper on the 
issue and successfully reached its goal when the Spanish Parliament passed 
the new Competition Law (Law 15/2007) with close to political unanimity.  
The new Law not only upgraded the legal framework but also created a new 
institution, the National Competition Commission (CNC) which integrated the 
two previous competition institutions, the TDC and the SDC. A President was 
appointed by the Government 
operative units: the Directorate
mainly information gathering and the preparation of
composed by six members, including the President, w
making over the dossiers; and the Directorate
was commissioned the task 
preparing reports. The CNC 
with an economic advisory
Economist department
Promotion (see figure 3).
Figure 3. 
Source. CNC. 
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-General for Investigation, whose function was 
 dossiers; the Council, 
ith the role
-General for Promotion, which 
of analyzing the competition climate in Spain and 
was also supported by a General Secretariat and 
 section, which after a period of time became
and later remained as a support unit to the DG of 
The organization of the CNC in 2013
 three major 
 of decision-
 a Chief 
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In 2010, the Spanish Parliament passed the Law 2/2011 that introduced the 
requirement of a hearing in the Spanish Parliament for the president of the 
CNC, as well as for the presidents of the other regulatory bodies, before 
confirming their appointment. This law also established that these boards would  
be made up of seven members, including the president.  
In terms of staffing, the CNC reached a maximum of 203 workers in 2009 and 
was subsequently downsized to 181 employees in 2013. Regarding the 
composition of the staff, consistently more than 90% of the employees have 
been civil servants over time. In terms of available resources, the CNC budget 
corresponding to 2013 was 12.5 million euro. In relative terms to the five larger 
EU economies, the CNC budget per staff member, roughly 68,500 euros, was 
the lowest (see table 3). With respect to the budget as a proportion of the GDP, 
the CNC was placed in the middle-low range with approximately 12,200 euros 
of budget per billion of GDP, much closer to the minimum corresponding to 
Germany (9,300) than to the maximum corresponding to the U.K. (54,200 
euros). 
Table 3. Staff and Budget of the NCA in the five larger EU economies, 
2012/13 
Source. NCA Annual Reports.
Of course, these comparisons should be made with caution. One of the reasons 
is that while in most countries, the competition authority is unique and 
centralized, in Spain the legal responsibilities for promoting and investigating 
competition-related issues do not correspond exclusively to the CNC but also to 
the regional competition authorities. Indeed, there has been a gradual creation 
of regional competition authorities. By 2013, there were ten such authorities 
Germany France U.K. Italy Spain
NCA Staff 320              188                 657              262                 184                 
NCA Budget (million euro) 25.0             20.4                104.6           53.0                12.6                
Country 2012 GDP (billion euro) 2,666.4        2,032.3           1,929.6        1,567.0           1,029.0           
NCA budget per billion of GDP, euro 9,375.9        10,037.9         54,209.2      33,822.4         12,244.9         
NCA budget per staff member, euro 78,125.0      108,510.6       159,210.0    202,290.1       68,478.3         
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corresponding to the regions of Andalusia, Aragon, Basque Country, Castile 
and León, Catalonia, Extremadura, Galicia, Canary Islands, Murcia, and 
Valencia. The budget and staff of these regional competition authorities should 
be combined with that of CNC to have a more complete comparison of the 
situation in the five larger EU countries. However, the necessary information is 
not publicly available for all regional authorities. Marcos (2011), Campos and 
Jiménez (2004 and 2008), Espitia (2006), and Nadal and Roca (2003) analyze 
this decentralization process. Nadal and Roca (2003) argue that the regional 
authorities in Spain may reduce by 60% the number of cases addressed at the 
central level. They also argue that these institutions are more ambitious in 
scope than their counterparts in the German länder. The available studies 
largely conclude that the improvement in welfare due to better information must 
be balanced against the likely increase of capture by local interests (see also 
Montolio and Trillas, 2013, and Trillas, 2011, and references therein, for the 
advantages and disadvantages of decentralizing regulation). This is likely the 
reason why these authorities do not have a substantial role in merger policy. 
Concerning enforcement output, the CNC has increased the financial penalties 
imposed on firms operating in Spain by a factor of 8 during its seven-year 
period (see figure 4). 
Figure 4. Financial penalties imposed by the CNC for improper business 
behaviour (million euro)
Source. CNC.Report of Activities, 2012/13. 
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The CNC stood as the main competition policy authority in Spain up to 2013, 
with an exclusive mandate at the national level on competition issues, including 
those in the regulated sectors. This has created some conflicts, as the CNC and 
the sector regulators have occasionally approached competition issues, mainly 
in energy and telecommunications, with different criteria (see Trillas, 2013 for a 
more detailed account of these conflicts). 
In October 2013, the new National Commission for Markets and Competition 
(CNMC) replaced the CNC and became fully operative by integrating the CNC 
functions together with the functions of other regulatory bodies.  
3.2 The CNMC Reform 
3.2.1 The Process of the Reform 
We asserted above that institutional structure changes with technology and 
demand and with the outcome of political games played by governments, 
legislatures, and relevant interest groups. In January 2012, the Spanish 
Government that resulted from a political change in the general election of 
November 2011 set up a ministerial taskforce with the mission of reforming the 
institutional framework of competition policy and regulatory architecture in 
Spain. The initial draft of the reform was controversial because it mirrored the 
conclusions of a consulting report commissioned by the telecommunications 
incumbent, Telefónica (see Trillas, 2013). The Government was committed to 
implementing this reform in the second semester of 2012 as one of the 
economic policy measures included in the National Reform Program (NRP) 
submitted to the EC in 2012 (Government of Spain 2012), as part of the 
program of structural reforms adopted after the financial and euro crisis that 
began in 2008.  This deadline was not met and the Government included the 
reform commitment once again in the 2013 NRP (Government of Spain 2013).  
In contrast to the process that led to the creation of the CNC in 2007, the reform 
process that started in 2012 was strictly controlled by the central Government 
ministries with very scarce external input, at least in terms of a formal and 
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transparent procedure. When a draft law was ready in mid-May 2012, the EC, 
concerned about the devolution of powers to ministries, released a report 
arguing that “the current draft Law that creates the CNMC does not guarantee 
that it will carry out its regulatory activity in an effective and independent way” 
(European Commission, 2012). The Spanish Government introduced changes 
in the Law but the final approved version still included legal provisions that 
devolved regulatory powers to the ministries, as discussed below. The EC was 
also concerned that the creation of the new merged authority would require 
appointing new board members, which de facto implied reneging on the 
commitment to respect the terms of the sitting board members of the previous 
agencies. Regardless of the legal characteristics of the new agency, the 
institutional change would be an example of limited independence de facto
because of this action. Future investors might be concerned that the regulatory 
institutions in Spain are fragile and may not survive political change, making 
policy prediction difficult and investment returns uncertain. 
In 2012, the CNC (the previous competition policy authority) also released an 
assessment report (National Competition Commission, 2012b) on the draft 
version of the reform. The report warned against the same limitations 
mentioned by the EC (particularly the risk of devolution of powers to the 
ministries) and it also raised fresh concerns about issues that, according to the 
CNC, were not satisfactorily addressed in the draft law. The main concerns 
were the risk of losing specialized expertise in regulatory and competition 
supervision as a result of the institutional reorganization, and the possibility that 
the financing of the CNMC would not be sufficiently secure and protected from 
political interference.4 The regulatory authorities in the energy and 
telecommunication sectors also released fairly critical assessments of the 
reform (National Commission of Energy 2012, Telecommunications Markets 
Commission 2012) along the same lines. 
Finally, the Law that created the CNMC (Law 3/2013) was approved by 
Parliament, with a weaker political majority than the 2007 reform, and entered 
 
4 In July 2015, when this manuscript was being revised, the Spanish Supreme Court of Justice 
(TS) raised concerns about the validity of the CNMC model precisely along these lines by 
addressing an opinion request to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
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into force on June 4, 2013. The Government had prepared a gradual 
implementation plan to ease the institutional transition. In August, a Royal 
Decree (657/2013) approved the statute of the functioning of the CNMC; in 
September, the ten Council (or Board) members were elected, the CNMC was 
legally established in October as a full-standing public agency and in November 
the Director-Generals were appointed. As a separate piece of legislation, but 
with important regulation implications, the Telecommunication Act was passed 
in April 2014. 
3.2.2 An assessment of the rationale for the reform
According to the Spanish Government (preamble of Law 3/2013), the CNMC 
reform sought to fulfill three main principles:  
• respect for the rule of law and institutional reliability, 
• ability to reap the benefits of economies of scale, and 
• adaptation of the regulatory bodies to technological change. 
Concerning the first principle, the main idea put forward by the Government to 
justify the organizational change was that the overlap of regulatory bodies with 
concurrent legal responsibilities about the same economic activity or industry 
may damage desirable economic policy values like predictability and the 
fulfilling of the rule of law. To alleviate this problem, the integration would 
presumably bring coherence and clarity in the enforcement of regulation and 
competition policy. However, regulatory and competition policy functions are 
inherently different and therefore it may be desirable to publicly discuss the 
tension between these two approaches for the sake of greater accountability 
and ultimately greater consumer welfare in the long run (see Trillas, 2013). 
In terms of the economies of scale derived from the integration, the Government 
estimated that the creation of the CNMC would result in total savings of 28 
million euros. However, two-thirds of this amount is not a reduction in current 
spending but instead imputed as the consequence of not setting up the 
regulatory bodies whose creation was mandated by law (in gambling, audio-
visual industry, and airports). Beyond the potential reduction in administrative 
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costs, the government’s plans are silent about other potential costs and benefits 
of the reform. 
Finally, it is hard to see how the institutional reorganization of the CNMC makes 
the Spanish regulatory policy more able to cope with technological change (for 
an analysis of the positive role of institutional diversity in antitrust in the 
information society, see Gavil and First, 2014, on the Microsoft cases).  
3.2.3 The Content of the Reform 
3.2.3.1 Institutional dimension 
The CNMC was created to perform two main functions:
• defense and promotion of competition in any market, 
• regulatory functions in the sectors and activities where antitrust policy is 
not enough to ensure market efficiency, of which absence of market 
power is only an aspect. 
The first function broadly corresponds with the functions of the former CNC, 
while the second represents the continuation of the tasks undertaken by the 
former regulatory agencies.  
In terms of structure, the CNMC is governed the Council and the President. The 
Council, or Board, is a collegiate body with executive power and it is made up of 
ten members, including the President, whose function includes representation 
and coordination. Council members are appointed by the Government with the 
Parliament having a veto right. Each member is appointed for a non-renewable 
term of six years with staggered turnover appointments every two years. 
The Council has two levels: it operates as a Plenary, and in two different 
Sections or Chambers, each of which is in charge of one of the two main 
functions: regulation and competition. Council agreements are adopted by 
majority, with the President having an additional tie-breaking vote. Subsequent 
legislation that determined the functioning of the CNMC (Royal Decree 
657/2013) left the organization of those Sections very open, allowing the 
Plenary full autonomy to determine specifics. The law imposes only mild 
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restrictions: no Council member can be a permanent member of one Section 
and the composition of the Council is to be renewed only gradually.  
In operative terms, there have been some changes in the structure of the 
CNMC since its creation. When this paper goes to press, there are four 
Directorates-General in charge of documenting and preparing the cases that will 
be submitted to the Council for deliberation and decision-making: Competition; 
Telecommunications and Media; Energy; and Transports and Postal Mail. Each 
of those contains Deputy Directorates-General that deal with specialized issues. 
In addition to these information-gathering DGs, two other directive units provide 
general services, the General Secretariat General and the Internal Control 
Department. Another Directorate-General, the Advocacy Department, is 
responsible for the promotion of competition and it is in charge of producing 
reports and analysis (see figure 5). 
Figure 5. 
Source. CNMC. 
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3.2.3.2 Legal dimension 
The Law that creates the CNMC has also devolved administrative and 
investigation competences to the Spanish Ministry of Industry in two policy 
areas, the audiovisual and the energy sectors (see Table 4 for the details) 
Table 4. Legal competences attributed to the Spanish Ministry of Industry 
by the Law 3/2013 that creates the CNMC 
Audiovisual sector
Additional disposition no. 7 in Law 3/2013. 
Energy sector
Additional disposition no. 8 in Law 3/2013.  
• To receive the kick-off activity notifications 
from audiovisual operators  
• To administer the national operators 
registry 
• To decide about any matter related to the 
audiovisual licenses and permits such as 
their granting, cancellation, duration, etc. 
• To verify the law concerning the 
limitations on the acquisition of shares by 
operators 
Electricity sector 
• To oversee the correct technical well-
functioning and economic operation 
conditions of the electricity production 
premises 
• To open investigations for breaching the 
prescribed technical or economic 
operation terms 
• Consumer protection 
• To make the clearing of the transportation 
and distribution network costs 
Hydrocarbon sector 
• To oversee the correct technical well-
functioning and economic operation 
conditions of the electricity production 
premises 
• To open investigations for breaching the 
prescribed technical or economic 
operation terms 
• To make the clearing of the transportation 
and distribution network costs 
• Consumer protection 
• To run the system for the certification of 
biofuels 
• To oversee the activity of the Office for 
Switching of Service Providers 
• The competences on liquid hydrocarbon 
fuels so far attributed to the CNE 
Source. Law 3/2013 on the Creation of the CNMC. 
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The new Law also allocated to the Ministry of Industry powers on merger control 
for the energy sector that were previously held by the sector regulator, CNE. 
The configuration of competition policy in the Spanish energy sector had been a 
controversial issue in recent times (see Federico and Vives, 2008 for a detailed 
account and Trillas, 2013, for a more recent comprehensive review of the 
regulated sectors in Spain). According to Trillas (2013), the independence of 
Spanish energy regulator in particular had been challenged, in part, as a 
byproduct of the corporate control battle triggered by the energy liberalization 
process taking place in Europe since 2000.  
All large Spanish energy firms had participated in this takeover wave: either as 
buyers, targets or both. In this highly-sensitive issue, the Spanish Government 
retained for itself the last word on merger control for the energy sector until the 
middle-2000s. However, with the justification of seeking greater independence 
for merging decisions on the electricity sector, the more substantial powers on 
merger control were later transferred to the CNE (“Function 14”). The legal 
change introduced by the CNMC law now devolves the merger-control power to 
the Spanish Ministry of Industry. 
In addition, the Spanish Government passed in April 2014 a new 
Telecommunication Law (Law 9/2014) that strikes a balance in terms of the 
regulatory powers allocated to the CNMC and the Government. The starting 
point, according to the now-replaced telecommunications Spanish regulator 
(CMT), was that the Spanish regulatory body in telecommunication had the 
fewest number of competences across the EU (see table 5 for a comparison 
with the other four largest EU economies). 
Table 5. Legal competences of the telecommunications national 
regulatory bodies (selected countries)
 Germany 
BNETZA 
France 
ARCEP 
UK 
OFCOM 
Italy 
AGCOM 
Spain 
CMNC 
Market regulation X X X X X 
Network security   X X  
Spectrum management X X X X  
Consumer protection X X X X  
Other (e-commerce,...) X   X  
Source. National Regulatory Bodies. 
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The new telecommunications law established that the CNMC would have legal 
competences in ex-ante regulation, conflict resolution between operators, and 
the possibility of mandating functional separation as acknowledged both by the 
EU regulation and the Law 3/2013 itself.  Moreover, according to the 
telecommunication law, all telecommunication-audiovisual legal competences, 
current and forthcoming, not explicitly assigned to the Spanish ministry, would 
belong to CNMC.  
3.2.4. Overall Assessment 
For various reasons, several EU countries (and others as well; see the case of 
Mexico in Delgado and Mariscal, 2014), have recently reformed their regulatory 
and/or competition policy institutional frameworks. The debate is open about to 
what extent these reforms will help these agencies better deal with the 
pressures of lobbyists and political interests, or whether the reforms themselves 
are a byproduct of them. This is the case also in Spain. As a general 
assessment, we consider to what extent absolute integration, the structure of 
the agency, and the devolution of powers to ministries, may contribute to some 
concept of general interest (taking the academic literature and international 
practice as a reference) or are just a product of interest battles that contribute 
little to social welfare. 
The first consideration, from an international comparative perspective, is that 
this model of ‘absolute integration’ adopted by the Spanish Government is 
relatively rare in the EU, with only the Netherlands and Estonia (both smaller 
countries than Spain) having a comparable integrated setup. Although 
regulation and competition policy interact in liberalizing industries, the 
experience of most developed countries suggests that there is still much to be 
gained in terms of incentives and accountability from keeping different agencies 
in regulation and competition policy. Savings in administrative costs could be 
achieved by merging the regulators of converging industries (such as 
telecommunications and broadcasting) requiring complementary effort inputs
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The rationales for integration appear to be different in the cases of Spain and 
the Netherlands. In Spain, the reform was chiefly justified by the potential to 
reap benefits of scale economies and bring about stronger “institutional 
reliability”. Only time will tell whether the CNMC will achieve these desirable 
goals. In the case of the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets, the entire 
strategic shift gravitated around consumer welfare as a central concern. This is 
instrumented practically by creating a full-fledged Consumer Department and by 
setting a web service, the ConsuWije, that advises consumers about their 
rights. In the same vein, the recent reform of the Competition and Markets 
Commission in the UK has been tilted explicitly towards greater consumer 
protection. Economic analysis provides sound reasons to support these 
consumer-oriented shifts in the remit of the regulators (see Clifton et al. 2014). 
By contrast, the new Spanish CNMC appears not to be as active in reaching out 
to consumers and responding to their concerns. To be fair, in Spain the 
Constitution allocates legal competences for consumer protection to the 
regional governments. Therefore, any meaningful move in the direction of more 
effective and direct consumer protection in Spain requires the involvement of 
the Central Government and the regional governments. 
A second consideration, acknowledging a priori that it is very hard to establish a 
superior institutional model, is that reforms can be tested against some 
internationally accepted practices that are consistent with academic research. 
To start with, the transatlantic experience of both the US and the EU suggests 
that well-performing competition authorities feature rigorous economic analysis 
in a prominent role. Second, the most advanced competition authorities rely on 
ambitious investigative tools that have “sharp teeth” and that deliver useful 
information in the information-gathering phase and for the preparation of case 
documentation. The high weight that civil servants have in the new agency in 
Spain brings into question its ability to recruit experts that can deliver such 
standards. Third, there is consensus that the accountability and assessment of 
the regulatory and competition authorities are necessary to effectively deliver 
business confidence and build up credibility. In this respect, the CNMC has an 
Internal Audit Unit that seems more directed to establishing a proper internal 
management control system (by controlling operations and budget) than to 
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performing a comprehensive and regular external impact analysis of its 
activities. 
Another issue raised by the CNMC reform is the devolution of legal 
competences from the regulators (either the individual, sector-specific existing 
before the reform or the new CNMC itself) to the Ministry, therefore weakening 
regulator independence. This economic and political operation was conducted 
in two stages. In the first stage, on occasion of the passing of the Law 3/2013 
that created the CNMC, some administrative and control powers were 
transferred by the Government from the regulators to the Ministry of Industry in 
the audiovisual and energy sector. In the same Law, the Government recovered 
control over merger operations in the electricity sector, which has been a very 
sensitive issue in Spain. In the second stage, by means of new 
telecommunications law (Law 9/2014) the Government somehow struck a 
balance between the regulatory powers kept for itself and those granted to the 
CNMC. Although the Government keeps a great deal of regulatory discretion in 
the telecommunications and audiovisual sector, the CNMC is granted with all 
legal competences not explicitly assigned to the Ministry.  
Finally, the actual degree of independence and accountability with which the 
authority works is (as argued above) of great importance, independent of the 
particular institutional design. In this respect, the Law that creates the CNMC is 
somehow ambiguous. 
The mechanism for renewing the CNMC Council (or Board) members 
(staggering turnover and non-renewable appointment terms of six years for the 
ten council members) is sound in that it follows internationally accepted 
practices and recommendations, and is comparable to those of most 
competition and regulatory authorities. However, the Government retains the 
right to appoint the Council members, who in turn have absolute discretion in 
appointing the Director Generals. In the same spirit, in contrast to internationally 
accepted practices, the CNMC is not granted a reliable and politically-insulated 
source of stable funding.   
These forms of control by the executive are questionable. In a system that fits 
better with accepted practice and academic recommendations, regulation 
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should first, at least for some tasks, receive the input of de facto independent 
agents. Second, the CNMC Council members and Director Generals should be 
appointed by means of a truly open process, based on merit, and effectively 
open to the institution’s outsiders. Ultimately, the resulting level of regulatory 
independence is lower than in the previous set-up, and homogeneous for 
sectors that probably require, as argued above, different optimal levels of 
institutional independence. Relatedly, by unilaterally changing legislation and 
taking advantage of the change to remove the regulators appointed by the 
previous majority, the new government de facto reneged on the existing level of 
independence. 
Although the Spanish government justified integration as a central part of the 
structural reforms that were needed to make the Spanish economy more 
competitive and productive, there is no evidence of the contribution of merged 
agencies to productivity or competitiveness. Although these considerations may 
have been relevant, other motivations for reform may have to do with the role of 
incumbent firms and interest groups seeking to advance their agendas in  
industries that generate rents and that have historically been highly politicized.
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have raised concerns about the step taken by the Spanish 
government to integrate the competition policy and regulatory agencies into a 
single authority. Regulatory agencies are influenced in their evolution by the 
pressures of interest groups and political principals. This has indeed been the 
case in the Spanish reform. 
Consolidation can be justified in industries where there is technological 
convergence; coordination between regulation and competition policy also 
makes sense when liberalizing industries. But this does not justify the extreme 
position of integrating almost all regulation and competition policy in a single 
agency, especially when the integration is not designed with consumer welfare 
as the main objective. This extreme position is not justified either by reasons of 
productivity or competitiveness, as the relationship between the institutions of 
regulation and competition policy (microeconomic tools) with stabilization or 
macroeconomic growth objectives is not well established. This does not mean 
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that efficient network industries and competition are not important in the long 
run, but there is little reason to believe that the institutional details of policy have 
macro implications. 
In contrast with the model of maximal integration adopted in Spain, the case for 
a certain degree of institutional diversity appears to be justified because, 
although some consolidation and coordination may be beneficial, diversity 
creates the conditions for accountability and sound decisions for consumers in 
markets that are complex, subject to the pressure of interest groups, and 
uncertain. 
Good board members and officials may over time overcome the institutional 
deficiencies that we have noted with regard to this reform. But the reform itself 
reveals interesting issues about the difficulties of regulatory independence in 
practice. If fairness in the process of reform is as important as the outcome (as 
argued in the behavioral literature), then the institutions of regulation and 
competition policy have not become more robust as a result of integration, 
because these institutions remain vulnerable to the changing opinions of the 
public, stakeholders, and potential new political majorities, who have not been 
involved in the reform process. 
37

References
Armstrong, M.; Sappington, D. E. (2006), Regulation, Competition and 
Liberalization, Journal of Economic Literature, 44(2): 325-366.  
Bel, G.; Fageda, X. (2013), Market Power, Competition and Post-privatization 
Regulation: Evidence from Changes in Regulation of European Airports, 
Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 16(2): 123-141. 
Campos, J.; Jiménez, J.L. (2004), La descentralización de la política de la 
competencia: algunas implicaciones sobre las estrategias empresariales, 
Anuario Jurídico y Económico Escurialense, XLI: 389-406. 
 Campos, J.; Jiménez, J.L. (2008), Efectos de la descentralización de la política 
de defensa de la competencia, Documento de Trabajo 2004-09, 
Universidad de la Laguna Económicas y Empresariales.  
Cini, M.; L. McGowan, L. (2009), Competition Policy in the European Union. 
Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cseres, K. (2010), Comparing Laws in the Enforcement of EU and National 
Competition Laws, European Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1): 7-44. 
Camerer, C.; Issacharoff, S.; Loewenstein, G.; O’Donoghue, T.; Rabin, M. 
(2003), Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”. University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 151: 1211-1254. 
Carpenter, D.; Moss, D.A., eds. (2014), Preventing Regulatory Capture. Special 
Interest Influence and How to Limit It, Cambridge University Press. 
Clifton, J. (2014), Beyond Hollowing Out: Straitjacketing the State, The Political 
Quarterly, 85(4): 437-444. 
Clifton, J.; Comín, F.; Díaz Fuentes, D. (2005), Empowering Europe’s Citizens? 
Towards a charter for services of general interest. Public Management 
Review, 7(3): 417-443. 
Clifton, J.; Díaz-Fuentes, D.; Fernández-Gutiérrez, M. (2014), The Impact of 
Socio-Economic Background on Satisfaction: Evidence for Policy-
makers, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 46(2): 183-206. 
Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones (2012), Informe sobre el 
Anteproyecto de Ley de creación de la Comisión Nacional de los 
Mercados y la Competencia. 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (2012a), Memoria de Actividades 2012-
2013. 
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (2012b), Informe sobre el Anteproyecto 
de Ley de Creación de la Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la 
Competencia. 
Comisión Nacional de la Energía (2012), Informe sobre el Anteproyecto de Ley 
de creación de la Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia. 
Competition and Markets Authority (2014), Vision, values and strategy for the 
CMA. 
38

Dal Bó, E. (2006), Regulatory Capture: A Review, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 22(2): 203-225. 
Delgado, J.; Mariscal, E. (2014), Integrating Regulatory and Antitrust Powers: 
Does it Work? Case Studies from Spain and Mexico, Competition Policy 
International, 10(1). 
Espitia, M., ed. (2006), Derecho de la competencia y mercados regionales y 
locales, Consejo Económico y Social de Aragón. 
Estache, A.; Wren-Lewis, L. (2009), Toward a Theory of Regulation for 
Developing Countries: Following J.J. Laffont’s Lead, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 47(3): 729-770.  
Estache, A.; Wren-Lewis, L. (2011), Anti-corruption Policy in Theories of Sector 
Regulation, in S. Rose-Akerman and T. Soreide, eds., International 
Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, Edward Elgar.
European Commission (2009), Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying 
the Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003. 
European Commission (2012), Assessment of the 2012 national reform 
programme and stability programme for Spain. SWD (2012) 310.  
Farrell, J.; Weiser, P.J. (2003), Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open 
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in 
the Internet Age, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 17(1): 86-127. 
Federico, G.; Vives, X.; Fabra, N. (2008), Competition and Regulation in the 
Spanish Gas and Electricity System. Reports of the Public-Private Sector 
Research Center no. 1. 
Florio, M. (2013), Network Industries and Social Welfare, Oxford University 
Press. 
Gavil, A.I.; First, H. (2014), The Microsoft Cases, MIT Press. 
González, A. (2006), Estudio sobre la revision de la institucionalidad regulatoria 
de los servicios sometidos a fijación tarifaria, Report for the Ministry of 
Economics, Chile.  
Government of Spain (2012), National Reform Programme for Spain, 2012.  
Government of Spain (2013), National Reform Programme for Spain, 2013.  
International Competition Network (2013), Investigative Tools Reports. 
Laffont, J.J. (2001), Incentives and political economy, Oxford University Press. 
Marinello, M.; Neven, D.; Padilla, J. (2015), Antitrust, Regulatory Capture and 
Economic Integration, Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2015/11. 
Marcos, F. (2011), Competencias autonómicas en los procesos de 
concentración de empresas, IE Law School Working Paper AJ8-179. 
Mishra, A. (2006), Corruption, Hierarchies and Bureaucratic Structure, in S. 
Rose-Ackerman, ed., International Handbook on the Economics of 
Corruption, Edward Elgar. 
Moe, T. (2013), Delegation, Control, and the Study of Public Bureaucracy, in R. 
Gibbons and J. Roberts, eds., Handbook of Organizational Economics, 
Princeton University Press. 
39

Montolio, D.; Trillas, F. (2013), Regulatory Policy and Industrial Policy in 
Broadband Telecommunications, Information Economics and Policy, 
25(1): 18-31. 
Nadal, M.; Roca, J. (2003), La descentralización de la política de defensa de la 
competencia en España: situación y perspectivas, Instituto de la 
Empresa Familiar. 
Newbery, D. (2000), Privatization, Restructuring and Regulation of Network 
Utilities, MIT Press.  
Spiller, P.; Tommasi, M. (2007), The Institutions of Regulation. An Application to 
Public Utilities, in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Springer. 
Stern, J. (2003), What the Littlechild Report Actually Said, Regulation Initiative 
Working Paper 55, London Business School. 
UNCTAD (2008), Independence and accountability of competition authorities.  
UNCTAD (2011), Foundations of an effective competition agency.  
Thaler, R. H.; Sunstein, C. R. (2013), Libertarian paternalism. The American 
Economic Review, 93 (2), 175-179. 
Trillas, F. (2010), Independent Regulators: Theory, Evidence and Reform 
Proposals, IESE Working Paper WP-860-E. 
Trillas, F. (2011), Regulatory Federalism in Telecommunications, Cuadernos 
Económicos del ICE, 81: 9-37. 
Trillas, F. (2013), The Institutional Architecture of Regulation and Competition: 
Spain’s 2012 Reform. IESE Working Paper, WP-1067-E.
Viscusi, W.K.; Gayer, T. (2015), Behavioral Public Choice: The Behavioral 
Paradox of Government Policy, forthcoming in Harvard Journal of Law 
and Public Policy. 
Vives, X., ed., (2009), Competition Policy in the EU. Fifty Years on from the 
Treaty of Rome. Oxford University Press. 
Xifré, R. (2014), Competition and Regulation Reforms in Spain in 2013: the 
CNMC - an international perspective. IESE WP-1108-E. 
TÍTOLNUM AUTOR DATA
Maig  2016Behavioral Regulatory Agencies16.06 Francesc Trillas
Abril  2016El impacto de la forma y estructura espacial urbana 
sobre las emisiones de CO2 en Concepción (Chile). 
¿Es compatible una baja densidad residencial con un 
16.05 Ivan Muñiz, Carolina Rojas, 
Carles Busuldu, Alejandro 
García, Mariana Filipe, 
Marc Quintana
Abril  2016¿CONLLEVA LA DESCENTRALIZACIÓN DE LA 
POBLACIÓN Y DEL EMPLEO UN MODELO DE 
MOVILIDAD MÁS EFICIENTE? 
16.04 Ivan Muñiz, Vania Sánchez 
Trujillo
Gener  2016Television and voting in Catalonia16.03 Iván Mauricio Durán
Gener  2016Economía de la Europeriferia16.02 Ferran Brunet
Gener  2016NOx emissions and productive structure in Spain: an 
input-output perspective
16.01 Vicent Alcántara, Emilio 
Padilla, Matías Piaggio
Desembre  
2015
Student preconceptions and learning economic 
reasoning
15.08 Isabel Busom, Cristina 
López-Mayán
Novembre  
2015
Seven Reasons to Use Carbon Pricing in Climate Policy15.07 Andrea Baranzini, Jeroen 
van den Bergh, Stefano 
Carattini, Richard Howarth, 
Emilio Padilla, Jordi Roca
Setembre  
2015
The long-run relationship between CO2 emissions and 
economic activity in a small open economy: 
Uruguay 1882 - 2010
15.06 Matías Piaggio, Emilio 
Padilla, Carolina Román
Juny  2015Low-Skill Offshoring and Welfare Compensation Policies15.05 Pablo Agnese, Jana 
Hromcová
Juny  2015Economic growth and productive structure in an 
input/output model: An alternative coefficient sensitivity 
analysis (english version of working paper 11.08)
15.04 Vicent Alcántara
Març  2015Dynamics of firm participation in R&D tax credit and 
subsidy programs
15.03 Isabel Busom, Beatriz 
Corchuelo, Ester Martínez-
Ros
Febrer  2015Teaching styles and achievement: Student and teacher 
perspectives
15.02 Ana Hidalgo-Cabrillana, 
Cristina Lopez-Mayan
Gener  2015The Long-Term Impact of Inequality on 
Entrepreneurship and Job Creation
15.01 Roxana Gutiérrez Romero, 
Luciana Méndez Errico
Octubre  
2014
The good, the bad and the ugly: The socio-economic 
impact of drug cartels and their violence in Mexico
14.07 Roxana Gutiérrez Romero, 
Mónica Oviedo León
